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R ecent indications have been mounting that courts and commen-
tators are rethinking the principles of regulatory crime.' One
aspect of this trend seems to be a move away from strictly utilitari-
an, no-fault criminal liability. Instead, an effort is being made to
identify and articulate the ways in which regulatory crimes do (in
some instances) or should (in others) reflect the traditional culpabil-
ity-based moral underpinnings2 of the criminal law. A good exam-
ple of this trend is the Supreme Court's slow but continuing explo-
ration of a normative approach to interpreting mental-state provi-
sions in ambiguous regulatory crime statutes.3 A recent article ex-
plored some of the issues involved in interpreting environmental
crimes statutes so that they incorporate a modem version of mens
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1. See generally e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integra-
tion in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal
Law, 83 GEO. L. J. 2407 (1995); Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental
State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The Environmental Example, 25 ENVTL. L.
1165 (1995).
2. A basic tenet of criminal law is that serious punishment and stigma may
not be imposed absent moral culpability. See, e.g., Mandiberg, supra note 1, at
1177. Nineteenth-century federal courts struggled to integrate this tenet into their
interpretation of regulatory crimes, which were just being adopted by Congress.
See id. at 1178-84. However, they gave up the struggle at the beginning of the
twentieth century and instead turned to a "strict liability" interpretation. See id. at
1184-88. Since about the 1950s, however, the Supreme Court has once again
begun to explore the normative underpinnings of modem regulatory crime. See
id. at 1188.
3. See id. at 1188-1204. This Essay will use the term "normative" as a short-
cut for a culpability-based approach to assessing criminal liability. See id. at 1167
n.10 (discussing use of this term).
882 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
rea.4 This Essay will discuss an aspect of the mental-state issue in
greater depth. It will also explore another doctrinal area important
to environmental crimes that traditionally reflects normative culpa-
bility. This is an act-element doctrine - liability for omissions -
that this Essay will address in the context of the "responsible cor-
porate officer" doctrine.
The discussion that follows will show how difficult it is to apply
traditional criminal law jurisprudence in the regulatory context.
Because Congress has not adopted the Model Penal Code,' its in-
terpretive protocol is not directly applicable to federal statutes.6 In
addition, the Court has said that statutory construction must be
conducted "in light of the background rules of the common
law.. . ."' However, common-law principles are not always well
understood. That is, although it is often easy to figure out what the
common-law rule is, opinions and treatises rarely explore why the
rule takes the form it does. However, if we want to use criminal
law principles in a meaningful way, the "why" is often the most
critical question.
This Essay will raise some of the important issues in harmonizing
regulatory and criminal law doctrines. While it will suggest some
answers, it does not intend to resolve the problems. Rather, this
Essay will provide merely another step in what is expected to be a
long-term and continuing exploration.
I. MENTAL STATE
Since about the mid-1950s, the United States Supreme Court has
been developing a normative protocol for interpreting the mental
state requirements of ambiguous federal criminal statutes.8 This
4. Mandiberg, supra note 1.
5. See Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 1235-36.
6. See id.
7. United States v. Staples, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1797 (1994).
8. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994); Sta-
ples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994); United States v. Posters 'N' Things,
114 S. Ct. 1747 (1994); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994); Cheek v.
United States,, 498 U.S. 192 (1991); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419
(1985); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); United
States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971); United States v. International Min. &
Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957);
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v.
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protocol uses traditional common law principles either directly or
by analogy. 9 In developing its approach, the Court has begun to
articulate the nature of the modem moral consensus underlying use
of the criminal sanction to enforce regulatory violations.'0 Howev-
er, the Court's approach departs from its normative core in one
major respect. When dealing with a "public welfare offense,"" the
protocol allows the government to convict a violator who believed
that the proper permit or license existed for engaging in the activi-
ty.
12
In a previous article, it was explained why the defendant's aware-,
ness of the fact of permit status is an essential element of moral
culpability for many regulatory crimes."' However, that article did
not address the more difficult issue presented by a defendant who
knew that a permit existed but misunderstood what the permit said.
If the actor mistakenly believed the permit allowed the actions, was
the actor aware of wrongdoing in the moral sense required by tradi-
tional criminal law principles? 4
United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952); Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 1188-1204.
9. Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 1204-15.
10. The Court has interpreted some types of regulatory crimes to include
an "awareness of the non-criminal law" element. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425 (hold-
ing that to convict defendant of the food stamp crime at issue, the government
must prove "the defendant knew his conduct to be unauthorized by statute or
regulations"); id. at n.9 (explaining that the issue was mistake of other law, not
criminality); see Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 1196-98. This approach reflects both
a traditional and a modern consensus that a person is aware of moral wrongdoing
when actually aware of violating the law. Id. at 1210.
The Court interprets other types of regulatory crimes to require awareness
of engaging in activity that is both uncommon and dangerous to the public health
and safety. Id. at 1198-1203 (reviewing and summarizing cases). This approach
reflects an attempt to articulate a modern moral consensus similar to the tradition-
al views underlying general intent crimes. Id. at 1210, 1211-13.
11. A "public welfare offense," in the Court's usage, deals with an activity
that "a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regulation
and may seriously threaten the community's health or safety," Liparota, 471 U.S.
at 433, and that is, in addition, not commonplace. Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1798-
1800.
12. See Freed, 401 U.S. at 607; Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 1223.
13. In other words, a defendant should be acquitted if the jury believes she
made a reasonable mistake of fact about permit status. See Mandiberg, supra note
1, at 1223-27.
14. See Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 1204-11 (discussing the moral under-
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As with awareness of permit status, the permit's meaning has
implications for the Court's interpretive protocol. The Court's com-
pass point seems to be the notion that a felony conviction presumes
moral culpability. 5 If this is so, the Court may need to interpret
ambiguous "public welfare offense" statutes to require proof of
defendant's awareness of understanding of the prohibitions con-
tained in the permit.
Of course, not all "public welfare offense" statutes are ambiguous
in this regard. In the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"), 6 for example, various sub-sections impose criminal
sanctions for acting in violation of a permit condition or require-
ment." These seem unambiguously to require the government to
prove defendant's awareness of what the permit said. 8 However,
the issue is presented under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 9
where the criminal enforcement provision is ambiguous as to the
precise nature of the mental-state requirement."
pinnings of traditional criminal law).
15. See id. at 1188-98 (explaining how the Court's interpretive protocol re-
flects moral considerations). In applying this protocol, the Court may be using
statutory interpretation as a way to avoid the constitutional issue of whether due
process requires mens rea for a felony conviction. See id. at 1239.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i, Solid Waste Disposal Act §§ 1002-11012
(1995) ("SWDA").
17. 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (d)(2)(B) and (d)(7)(A), SWDA § 3008. See also sub-
sections (d)(2)(c) and (d)(7)(B) (imposing similar sanctions regarding interim
status regulations or standards).
18. Id. Sub-section (d)(2)(B) provides, in pertinent part: "Any person
who ... knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or
listed under this sub-chapter ... in knowing violation of any material condition
or requirement of such permit . . . shall [be guilty of a crime]."(emphasis sup-
plied). The relevant language of sub-section (7)(A) is identical. The only case to
address the mental state issue in these provisions indicates that the government
must prove defendant's awareness of what the permit required. United States v.
Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1091 (10th Cir. 1993) (interpreting the word "knowing" in
sub-section (d)(2)(B) to ensure the defense of good-faith belief that the activity
was permitted).
19. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 101-
607 (1995) ("FWPCA").
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2), FWPCA § 309(c)(2), authorizes criminal sanc-
tions for "[a]ny person who ... knowing[ly] violates ... any permit condition or
limitation ... or any requirement imposed ... in a permit." Unlike the RCRA
provisions noted in the previous footnote, the word "knowing" appears only once,
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To understand the problem under the CWA, consider a business
that wants to discharge toxic pollutants2 from its factory22 direct-
ly into a river." In order to do this legally, the business must first
obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit24 by applying to the proper state or federal
agency. The agency establishes the terms of the permit through an
interaction between agency personnel and the business itself, with
input from the public through comment or public hearing.25 The
permittee may obtain judicial review of the terms of the permit or
the process of obtaining a permit according to existing standards.26
The resulting permit provisions will consist of quotations or para-
phrases from statutes and regulations, language that quotes or para-
phrases other published agency materials, and language that is
found only in this permit or other permits. The business then must
comply with these permit terms regarding the amount of pollutants
discharged into the river.27 When the company or one of its em-
ployees claims not to understand what a permit requires, it is this
language in the permit that is at issue.
Take, for example, a plant manager who discharges a toxic pol-
lutant in quantities greater than allowed under the plant's NPDES
permit.2 The manager is charged criminally with a knowing viola-
tion of the CWA.29 The defendant claims that he read the permit
at the beginning of the subsection. Thus, it is possible to ask which of the ensu-
ing elements the word "knowing" "goes with."
21. The CWA regulates direct discharges of "pollutants," which are de-
fined as "dredged spoil, solid waste, [and so forth] discharged into water." 33
U.S.C. § 1362(6), FWPCA § 502(6).
22. The pipe or conduit leading from the factory to the river would be
considered a "point source." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14), FWPCA § 502(14).
23. The CWA regulates discharges of pollutants into "navigable waters,"
defined at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), FWPCA § 502(7), as "the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas." Id.
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-(b), FWPCA § 402(a)-(b).
25. 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.10-.14 (1994) (setting forth the procedures for public
input).
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1), FWPCA § 509(b)(1).
27. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342, FWPCA §§ 301(a), 402.
28. The facts in this example are loosely based on those in United States
v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2), FWPCA § 309(c)(2).
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and concluded that it allowed excess discharges under the condi-
tions that existed at the time of the alleged violation. However, the
regulatory agency, for example the EPA,3  disagrees with the
defendant's interpretation. Assuming that the EPA's version is
correct,3 will the defendant's mistake provide a defense? If the
government has to prove at trial that the defendant knew what the
permit actually prohibited, the defendant is entitled to use his mis-
take as a defense. To what extent should such knowledge be an ele-
ment of a CWA felony charge?32
The mistake in the hypothetical is different from a mistake about
permit status. A defendant who makes a mistake about permit status
says, "Yes, I knew a permit was required, but I thought we had
one." This is a mistake of fact. The mistake in the hypothetical, on
the other hand, is a mistake of law.33 Specifically, it is a mistake
30. In many instances, the relevant agency will be that of the state. See 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b)-(e), FWPCA § 402(b)-(e) (outlining the conditions under which
state regulations and permits are substituted for those of the federal government).
31. A defendant can always argue that the agency's interpretation is
wrong. However, courts are inclined or required to defer to agency interpretations
of the statutes, regulations, and permits they administer. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (regarding stat-
utes); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945) (regarding
regulations); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (regarding statutes
and articulating a less extreme form of deference than Chevron). See generally
Justice Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989), Jamie A. Yavelberg, Note, The Revival of
Skidmore v. Swift: Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations after EEOC v.
Aramco, 42 DUKE L.J. 166 (1992). As a result of the deference given to the
agency's interpretation, the defendant's argument that the agency is wrong is
likely to fail in most cases. E.g., Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1288 (rejecting
defendant's interpretation of EPA's regulation on the ground that EPA's differing
interpretation "is entitled to considerable weight."). Of course, the validity of
deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute providing the basis for felony
prosecution is another issue in need of more exploration.
32. This question is relevant only when the CWA felony is considered a
"public welfare offense" which will be interpreted according to the court's proto-
col. However, there are instances in which a CWA felony arguably is not a "pub-
lic welfare offense." See Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 1219-21 (discussing the
CWA's wetlands provisions).
33. Accord Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1288 (noting that construction of a
NPDES permit is a matter of law). But see Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 1171
n.26 (mistakenly referring to this as a mistake of fact).
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of non-criminal law.34 This characterization is clearest when the
permit provision is taken directly from the CWA. In this situation,
a mistake about the permit is the functional equivalent of a mistake
about the statute itself. Similarly, when the permit provision is
taken from an EPA regulation, a defendant's mistake is the func-
tional equivalent of a mistake about the regulatory law.35 However,
as noted above,36 even the permit provisions that are not quotes or
paraphrases of existing law have been through a sort of individual-
ized "notice and comment" process. Thus, in all of these situations,
Congress has either made the law that forms the basis for the per-
mit provision, or it has delegated the lawmaking authority to an
agency that has carried out its task in a standardized fashion. The
permit holder can participate in the process at a variety of levels
and has notice of the statute, the regulation, and the permit itself.
Once the mistake is characterized as one of "law" rather than
"fact," standard analytical approaches have nothing more to say.
Traditionally, the government is not required to prove awareness of
law; thus, mistakes of law do not provide a defense.37 However,
the issue can be pushed beyond the limits of standard analysis. The
question is whether, in the context of a "public welfare offense,"3
the crime lacks a moral basis without proof of defendant's aware-
ness of violating the regulation. That is, assuming it is immoral to
cause an unpermitted discharge of toxic pollutants into water-
ways,39 is the defendant considered to be aware of wrongdoing if
he honestly believed the discharge was allowed by the terms of the
permit?
This analysis is aided by the fact that in the last century some
34. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 154-57
(2d ed. 1995). Mistakes of other law can be distinguished from mistakes about
criminality. Defendant would be making a mistake of criminality if his argument
was, "I knew I was violating my permit, but I did not know it was a crime to do
so." Here, the defendant is saying, "I knew it was a crime to violate my permit,
but I was not aware of violating it."
35. Cf., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 752 (1986) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (explaining that agency regulations have the force of law).
36. See supra, notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 1205 n.231.
38. See supra note 11 (defining "public welfare offense").
39. See Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 1211 and 1219 n.309.
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common-law jurisdictions have allowed a type of "mistake of law"
defense to some crimes. These crimes incorporate an issue of non-
criminal law as an aspect of the "specific intent" element. For ex-
ample, the crime of "theft" requires a specific intent to deprive
another of his property; the government must prove the defendant's
awareness that the property belonged to another. Therefore, mistake
about the law of property that caused the defendant to believe the
property was his own provides a defense in some common law
jurisdictions.' However, the situation is different when the crime
only requires proof of general intent. An example is the crime of
"bigamy." There, the defendant's mistake of the law of divorce,
which led him to believe he was free to remarry, would not provide
a defense, even if the mistake was reasonable.4
The Supreme Court has adopted this distinction in its approach to
regulatory crime statutes. When an ambiguous regulatory statute
criminalizes "innocent" activities,42 the Court will, if possible, in-
terpret the statute to require the government to prove defendant's
knowledge that the activity violated non-criminal law, analogizing
this to the "theft" example given in the previous paragraph.43 That
40. See, e.g., ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW
851-54 (3d ed. 1982) (citing cases).
41. E.g., Braun v. State, 230 Md. 82, 87-89, 185 A.2d 905, 907-08 (Md.
App. 1962) (discussing precedent rejecting defense arguments based on legal
mistakes regarding freedom to remarry), State v. De Meo, 20 N.J. 1, 118 A.2d 1
(1955) (discussing the majority U.S. rule that rejects mistakes of law regarding
effect of out-of-forum divorces).
42. An "innocent" activity is one that does not fit the definition of a "pub-
lic welfare offense." See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 432-33 (1985)
(distinguishing innocent activities from "public welfare offenses"); Mandiberg,
supra note 1, at 1199, 1203-04.
43. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425 (holding that in prosecutions for food stamp
fraud, the government must prove "that the defendant knew his conduct to be
unauthorized by statute or regulations"). The Liparota Court denied that it was
creating a "mistake of law" defense. Id. at 425 n.9. However, the text of the foot-
note, especially when compared with the dissent's opinion, reveals that the Court
was merely clarifying that it was not establishing a defense for mistakes of crimi-
nality. The Court analogized the food stamp situation to "a statute making know-
ing receipt of stolen goods unlawful .... In both cases, there is a legal element
in the definition of the offense." Id. The Court then distinguished this allowable
mistake of law from an argument "that one did not know that [receipt of stolen
goods] was illegal [or] that one did not know that possessing food stamps in a
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is, the Court is treating "innocent activity" regulatory crimes as
crimes requiring specific intent." On the other hand, when an am-
biguous regulatory statute is a "public welfare offense," the Court
will interpret it to require only proof that the defendant was aware
of the facts that made the activity uncommon and dangerous to the
public health and safety. Awareness of regulation is not an element,
therefore, ignorance or mistake of non-criminal law is not a de-
fense. The Court is treating these as crimes in exactly the way that
traditional courts have treated crimes of general intent.
The CWA's felony provision is probably a "public welfare of-
fense," at least when the Act regulates the discharge of toxic pollut-
ants.a" Applying the Court's protocol, mistakes of non-criminal
law are no defense. As we have seen, this conclusion is consistent
with the common-law rule applied to non-regulatory crimes. On a
superficial level, at least, the regulatory and non-regulatory criminal
law appears to harmonize.
For some, it may be enough that the Supreme Court's present
approach to regulatory crimes mirrors the current common-law rule.
However, this common-law rule is relatively recent.' In addition,
in the cases that establish the rule for general intent crimes, the
non-criminal law dealt with morally ambiguous situations.47 In
these cases, when the common-law courts disallowed the mistake of
non-criminal law as a defense, they knew that the resulting convic-
tion did not reflect the defendant's choice to do moral wrong
manner unauthorized by statute or regulations was illegal." Id.
44. See Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 1219.
45. Id.
46. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 40, at 929-31 (citing one British
case from 1782, but other cases from no earlier than the late nineteenth century).
47. In the bigamy cases, for example, the legal issues tended to focus on
the effect of out-of-forum divorce decrees. The persons obtaining the decree
evidently felt that both the divorce and remarriage were moral. The state granting
the divorce evidently would agree, but the state prosecuting the bigamy charge
would not. Society's increasing lack of agreement on the morality of divorce
ultimately resulted in morally neutral no-fault divorce laws in all fifty states. Carl
E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law,
83 MICH. L. REv. 1803, 1809-10 (1985) (noting that adoption of no-fault divorce
laws beginning in the mid-1960s reflected changes in society's view of the mo-
rality of divorce). This situation, of course, reduces the circumstances in which
bigamy prosecutions will arise.
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they knew, in other words, that the resulting conviction was one of
strict liability.' If the thrust of current jurisprudence and judicial
doctrine is to eliminate strict liability as a basis for felony convic-
tions, then both the emerging common-law rule and the Court's
approach to regulatory crimes will have to develop further through
legislative choice,49 statutory interpretation, or constitutional re-
quirement." In other words, it may become necessary to allow
48. E.g., Braun v. State, 230 Md. 82, 89-90, 185 A.2d 905, 908 (Md. App.
1962) (asserting that in determining whether mistake about divorce law should be
a defense to bigamy, the issue is whether mens rea, or criminal intent, should be
required); State v. De Meo, 20 N.J. 1, 9-11, 118 A.2d 1 (1955) (noting that the
weight of authority in the United States allows convictions for bigamy to be
based on strict liability and explaining why the law is justified in imposing sanc-
tions without "moral culpability").
49. Cf., e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.04(1)(a) (allowing mistake of law to
be a defense whenever it negates the mental-state element of the crime).
50. The Court has hinted that statutes imposing felony sanctions without
proof of mens rea might be unconstitutional. See Mandiberg, supra note 1, at
1239 n.411. The Court's statutory interpretation may emphasize moral consider-
ations precisely to avoid reaching this constitutional issue.
In addition, another constitutional issue may push toward the same result.
In the general-intent crimes under consideration, mistake of fact remains a de-
fense. For example, in bigamy charges, the defendant can argue that she mistak-
enly believed her first husband was deceased. E.g., People v. Vogel, 299 P.2d
850, 852 (Cal. 1956) (holding that a "defendant is not guilty of bigamy if he had
a bona fide and reasonable belief that facts existed that left him free to remarry").
Stated from the perspective of the prosecutor's case in chief, when the lack of
freedom to remarry is a factual issue, the government must prove defendant's
awareness that she was not free. In addition, if "awareness of lack of freedom to
remarry" is an element of the crime, the prosecution must prove that element be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Compare Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)
with Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). If the defendant's lack of aware-
ness is due to a mistake of the law of divorce, the prosecution's burden is re-
moved through a conclusive presumption that the defendant is aware of the law.
Such conclusive presumptions violate due process. See County Court of Ulster
County v. Allen, 422 U.S. 140, 165 (1979). On the other hand, if the rule is
expressed in terms of a policy to exclude certain types of evidence as irrelevant
or prejudicial, the "mistake of law" rule might survive. Cf, Susan F. Mandiberg,
Protecting Society and Defendants Too: The Constitutional Dilemma of Mental
Abnormality and Intoxication Defenses, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 221 (1984-85)
(discussing the constitutionality of disallowing evidence of intoxication and men-
tal impairment to negate a required mental state). But see, Montana v. Egelhoff,
900 P.2d 260 (Mont. 1995) (holding that the trial court violated due process by
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those charged with felony "public welfare offenses" to argue mis-
takes of non-criminal law as a defense.
Such a development would be a radical change in the law of
regulatory crimes. Since a permit is just another type of non-crimi-
nal law, the defense would encompass claims that the defendant
was ignorant or mistaken about regulations and non-criminal stat-
utes. Such a change raises the specter of the government's inability
to obtain convictions.
This fear can be mitigated to some extent. For one thing, an
actor's awareness of regulation is often easily proven circumstan-
tially." In addition, to be consistent with the general-intent nature
of the crimes, the mistake would have to be reasonable to provide a
defense."
Given the nature of regulatory rule-making and administrative
instructing the jury that it could not consider evidence of defendant's voluntary
intoxication in determining whether the government could prove the required
mental state), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 593 (1995).
"Awareness of permit status" may be an element of proof in a "public
welfare offense." See Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 1222-34. If it is, the foregoing
analysis would apply. The desire not to start down this slippery slope may be
behind the Court's reluctance to require the government to prove awareness of
permit status.
51. Accord Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 434 (1985) (suggest-
ing that on remand the government will have little trouble proving awareness of
regulation because of the back-room nature of defendant's transaction); cf.
Weitzenhoff v. United States, 35 F.3d 1275, 1289 (9th Cir. 1994) (indicating in
the context of a due process "vagueness" analysis that defendants' attempts to
conceal their activities showed that they knew they were violating the law).
52. In other words, mistakes of non-criminal law would be treated identi-
cally to mistakes of fact, which must be reasonable to provide a defense to a
general intent crime. DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 154-157; PERKINS & BOYCE,
supra note 40, at 929; Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 1206-08; cf. Model Penal
Code § 2.04(1) (treating mistakes of non-criminal law identically with mistakes
of fact in negating mental-state requirements).
Requiring the mistake of non-criminal law to be reasonable would serve an
additional function, that of maintaining the distinction between "public welfare
offenses" and "innocent activity" crimes. This is so because, following the "spe-
cific intent" model, even unreasonable mistakes would be defenses to "innocent
activity" crimes. See, Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433 (requiring the government to
prove defendant's knowledge of violating regulations, thus implying that an hon-
est mistake of non-criminal law would provide a defense).
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oversight, it will be difficult for many defendants to establish a rea-
sonable mistake. If the Supreme Court is correct, a reasonable
person engaging in an uncommon and dangerous activity knows
that it is regulated.53 It would be unreasonable for that person to
fail to inquire about what the law allows or prohibits. In the context
of the environmental "command and control" statutes in particular,
a person can turn to published materials (statutes, regulations, and
some agency guidance documents), the relevant permits, and the
agency's own staff to clarify the regulatory law. Given the type of
egregious violations that lead to criminal charges, the defendant
who failed to make intelligent use of these resources probably has
made an unreasonable mistake.
It is likely, of course, that the change in law would make it im-
possible to convict some defendants who are vulnerable under
current rules.54 Still, in the cases in which a conviction would be
prevented it is valid to ask whether that is a bad thing.5 If an ac-
53. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, (1994) (indicating that a
person is on notice of regulation because of the uncommonness of an activity, as
well as its dangerousness); Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433 (defining "public welfare
offense" as, among other things, involving activities whose very nature gives
notice of regulation); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (indicat-
ing that a person should not be surprised to discover that hand grenades are regu-
lated).
54. The corporation, which participates in the process of acquiring a per-
mit, will be on notice of the permit's provisions. The same probably can be said
for the officers of the corporation and perhaps management-level personnel. If
these actors are unsure of how to interpret permit provisions, it would be unrea-
sonable for them to fail to check published agency guidance documents or to ask
agency personnel for the agency's interpretation.
The "reasonableness" requirement could, however, present difficulties if the
government wants to prosecute low-level employees who accepted explicit or
implicit guarantees of the employer and higher management that the activities of
employment were legal. The issue is whether it is reasonable for a worker at that
level not to check further. Whichever way this issue is resolved, it would be
beneficial for courts and commentators to debate and clarify the matter.
55. Accord Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2487-88. It is interesting to note that
in the course of the Symposium held by the Fordham Environmental Law Jour-
nal on February 29, 1996, a number of prosecutors asserted that they prosecute
only those violators who know that they are violating the law. As summarized
during the symposium by Neil Cartusciello, these prosecutors want this limitation
as a matter of discretion, but not as a requirement of proof.
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tor honestly and reasonably thought his activity was permitted,
imposition of the felony sanction is arguably inappropriate. This is
especially true given the full range of civil sanctions still available
to the government for the violation at issue. By the same token,
when the government convicts despite the existence of these moral-
ly based hurdles, society can be sure that the felony sanction has
been imposed justly.
II. ACT ELEMENT: OMISSIONS & RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE
OFFICERS
Assume that the Manager of a plant discharges waste in violation
of the company's NPDES permit and that considerable evidence
exists for convicting the manager under section 309 of CWA.56 Is
there any way to also attach criminal liability to the Manager's
superior, for example, the Vice President of the organization, whose
office is in a distant city, who had allocated sufficient resources to
the plant, and who had instructed the Manager never to permit such
a discharge? When is the Vice President even deserving of the
criminal sanction? The standard answer to both of these questions
is "sometimes."
The two ends of the continuum are easy to define. On the one
hand, if the Vice President aided or encouraged the Manager, in-
tending the violation to occur, she is deserving of punishment and
can be convicted under principles of accomplice liability,57 if not
as the actual perpetrator." These rules allow liability to rest not
only upon affirmative actions, but also on authorization or acquies-
cence by an officer in the criminal behavior of others. The Vice
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2), FWPCA § 309 (c)(2).
57. E.g., United States v. Ward, 676 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that
the chairman of the board was liable as aider and abettor on evidence that he
approved plans, made suggestions, was apprised of daily progress, and knew that
the company's employees and equipment were used in the violations), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982).
58. E.g., United States v. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d 662, 664-66 (3d
Cir. 1984) (holding that a foreman and service manager were open to RCRA
liability as principals even though they were not owners or operators able to ob-
tain a permit), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985); See generally 1 KATHLEEN F.
BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 5:02 (2d ed. 1984).
59. E.g., United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1451-52 (lth Cir. 1988)
(affirming RCRA conviction of owner-manager who knowingly ordered employ-
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President's status as an officer with responsibility for the Manager's
operations may even serve the government as persuasive circum-
stantial evidence in proving mental state.60 However, status alone
will not lead to conviction: On the other end of the continuum,
traditional criminal law principles establish that personal criminal
liability cannot be based solely on status. 6 Based on the doctrine
of respondeat superior,62 an organization can be convicted for its
ees to dump toxics or acquiesced in such activity); cf John F. Seymour, Civil
and Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers Under Federal Environmental Laws,
20 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 337, 340 (1989) (noting that "authorization can take more
subtle forms [than ordering or approving dumping] as well as where a corporate
officer directs his subordinate to dispose of waste as cheaply and conveniently as
possible, with knowledge that his subordinate will probably dispose of the waste
illegally").
60. E.g., United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d
35, 55 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that defendant's status as an officer can be evi-
dence of actual knowledge for purposes of RCRA liability); Johnson & Towers,
Inc., 741 F.2d at 670 (holding that in a RCRA prosecution the jury can infer that
a defendant acted "knowingly" from his position within the corporation). Such
circumstantial evidence is, of course, rebuttable.
The "willful blindness" doctrine also may be available to prove an officer's
knowledge. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1976) (quot-
ing trial court's instruction that the government can prove knowledge of a fact by
showing the defendant's "conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth"), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). But see Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 1229 n.365
(questioning the continued application of the willful blindness doctrine under the
Court's current approach).
61. E.g., Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 397 (1849) (holding that employer's
liability for acts of agent must be based on employer's act of giving improper
instructions); cf. Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 155 A.2d 825 (Pa. 1959) (holding
that employer could be held criminally liable for acts of employees without proof
of knowledge or participation but that incarcerating the employer violated due
process).
62. E.g., New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S.
481, 494-95 (1909); Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291, 1295 (8th
Cir. 1976) (allowing corporate criminal liability in a prosecution for failure to
report a discharge under the CWA); United States v. Little Rock Sewer Commit-
tee, 460 F. Supp. 6, 9 n.3 (E.D. Ark. 1978) (in CWA prosecution, applying vicar-
ious liability principles to a not-for-profit business entity that would benefit finan-
cially from its employee's crimes and that had supervisory powers and duties
analogous to those exercised by a corporate board of directors); United States v.
Georgetown University, 331 F. Supp. 69, 72-73 (D.D.C. 1971) (rejecting vicari-
ous liability in prosecution under Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, 33
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mere status as the offending Manager's employer. That doctrine
does not, however, extend criminal liability to an individual em-
ployer or supervisor.
Although these two ends of the continuum are easy to define, the
middle of the spectrum is murky. So far, this territory is staked out
by the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine. The doctrine arose
out of two cases applying the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics
Act ("FDCA").63 In the first case, United States v. Dotterweich,64
the Court affirmed the conviction of a corporation's president and
general manager for misdemeanors involving shipments of mis-
branded and adulterated drugs. 65 The Court noted that the Act's
purpose was to safeguard "the lives and health of people which, in
the circumstances of modem industrialism, are largely beyond self-
protection."' In addition, the statute allowed criminal conviction
without proof of "awareness of some wrongdoing. '67 Thus, the
statute "puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise
innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger., 68
The defendant "had no personal connection with either shipment,
but he had overall charge of the corporation's business and had
given general instructions to its employees to fill orders received
from physicians. 69 On this basis, the Court concluded that the
defendant fell within the category of persons who had "a responsi-
ble share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute
U.S.C. § 407 (1964), where university's employee was acting under the direction
of an independent contractor, and neither the contractor nor the supervisor was
the university's agent); see generally BRICKEY, supra note 58, at ch. 3-4.
63. 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) (1994).
64. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
65. Id. at 285. The corporation was acquitted of the same violations. The
Court dismissed as "baseless" the argument that the corporation's acquittal pre-
cluded Dotterweich's conviction. Id. at 279.
66. Id. at 280.
67. Id. at 281. The Court noted that the Act was "a now familiar type of
legislation whereby penalties serve as effective means of regulation." Id. at 280-
81. It imposed strict criminal liability and put "the burden of acting at hazard
upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public
danger." Id. at 281.
68. Id.
69. United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir.),
rev'd sub. nom., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1942).
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outlaws."70
In the second case, United States v. Park,7 the Court affirmed
the conviction of the president and chief executive officer of a very
large retail food chain. Violations involved the storage of food in
such a way that it became contaminated by rodents. The defendant
knew about the problems72 and, as was normal, had delegated re-
sponsibility for solving them to others.73 However, the defendant
also admitted that he was responsible in general for all operations
and results in the company.74 This was a sufficient basis for con-
viction75:
[Tlhe Government establishes a prima facie case when it introduc-
es evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier of the facts
that the defendant had, by reason of his position in the corpora-
tion, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first in-
stance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and
that he failed to do so.
76
Courts and commentators have various interpretations of the
doctrine established by these cases. Some courts see the "respon-
sible corporate officer" doctrine as eliminating the mental state
element of the crime 77-or significantly facilitating its
70. Dotterwiech, 320 U.S. at 284. The Court recognized potential hardship,
but found that "Congress has preferred to place [the hardship] upon those who
have at least the opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of condi-
tions imposed for the protection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce,
rather than to throw the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly helpless."
Id. at 285.
The Court did not try "to define or even to indicate by way of illustration
the class of employees which stands in such a responsible relation." Id. The
Court trusted that decision to "the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance
of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries." Id.
71. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
72. Id. at 661-63.
73. Id. at 663-64.
74. Id. at 664-65.
75. Id. at 673-74. Technically, the legal issue in Park was sufficiency of
the jury instructions. 421 U.S. at 660.
76. Id. at 673-74. The Court also mentioned favorably that "Courts of Ap-
peals have recognized that those corporate agents vested with the responsibility,
and power commensurate with that responsibility, to devise whatever measures
are necessary to ensure compliance with the Act bear a 'responsible relationship'
to, or have a 'responsible share' in, violations." Id. at 672.
77. E.g., United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1419-20 (10th Cir.
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proof 78-when the defendant is a responsible corporate offi-
cer. 79 This approach runs into a number of problems. Foremost,
the interpretation is not supported by the FDCA cases that gave
the doctrine its start."0 Another problem is that the interpretation
is probably unconstitutional.81 A third problem is that the ap-
1991) (indicating, arguably in dictum, that willfulness or negligence could be
imputed from an officer's status). But see, e.g., United States v. MacDonald &
Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 50-55 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that the trial
court erred in allowing the jury to use an officer's status as conclusive proof of
the required mental state, thus in effect eliminating the mental state requirement);
United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873, 895 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (rejecting use
of the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine in a prosecution under RCRA and
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") on the ground
that its use would "allow a conviction without showing the requisite specific in-
tent").
78. E.g., Jane F. Barrett & Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives on the
Knowledge Requirement of Section 6928(d) of RCRA After United States v. Dee,
59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 862, 883-88 (1991) (suggesting that the doctrine can be
used to establish a formal inference of knowledge upon proof that the officer
knew of a previous or potential violation and reviewing unchallenged jury in-
structions that adopted this approach).
79. These approaches should not be confused with the simple use of an
officer's status as circumstantial evidence of mental state. Unlike a formal infer-
ence, such circumstantial evidence is unaided by any specific judicial instruction.
Unlike the elimination of the mental state requirement, the evidence can be rebut-
ted, and the prosecution still must prove mental state beyond a reasonable doubt.
80. In those cases, the Court saw the misdemeanor provisions of the
FDCA as imposing strict liability, that is, as having no mens rea requirement.
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943).
81. If the mental state approach amounts to a declaration that a defendant's
"responsible corporate officer" status is conclusive proof of the required mental
state, this mandatory presumption is unconstitutional when applied to an element
of the crime. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979). The only way to
avoid the constitutional problem would be to argue that Congress did not intend a
mental state requirement when the defendant was a responsible corporate officer.
This interpretation would go far beyond the statutory language of most, if not all,
regulatory crimes, and is not supported by any recognized principle of statutory
interpretation.
Fewer constitutional problems exist if the approach amounts to a rebuttable
presumption that status proves the required mental state. However, even some
rebuttable presumptions and inferences may violate due process. E.g., Sandstrom,
442 U.S. 510; County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 165
(1979).
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proach seems inconsistent with the Court's allowance of a de-
fense based on powerlessness to prevent or correct the viola-
tion.82
A more defensible approach is an interpretation of the doctrine
as dealing with the act element of the offense. 3  The
Dotterweich Court determined that the FDCA was a crime of
strict liability, and from that fact it inferred that Congress also
intended to impose a duty on those who had "a responsible share
in the furtherance of the transaction" to seek out and prevent or
rectify violations. In other words, the statute imposes the duty on
certain officers, the organization's hierarchy determines who
those officers are, and liability is imposed for failure to perform
the duty unless the officers show that they were powerless to
prevent or correct the violation. There is strong support for this
approach in traditional criminal jurisprudence, which often allows
the government to prove a criminal act by establishing a failure
to perform a legal duty.84 The "responsible corporate officer"
doctrine merely declares that the criminal statute itself-not some
other source-imposes the legal duty to act. The officer's failure
to perform the duty is shown by the fact that the violation oc-
curred. The "powerlessness" defense is merely an application of
the traditional rule that an omission must be "voluntary" for the
officer to be culpable.
Note that, in adopting the mental state approach to the doctrine, the Tenth
Circuit did not deal with the constitutional issues. United States v. Brittain, 931
F.2d 1413, 1419-20 (10th Cir. 1991).
82. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673 (1975) (stating that the "re-
sponsible corporate officer" doctrine "does not require that which is objectively
impossible [and] permits a claim that a defendant was 'powerless' to prevent or
correct the violation .... ).
83. See generally Kathleen Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Offi-
cers for Strict Liability Offenses-Another View, 35 VANDERBILT L. REv. 1337
(1982) (suggesting that "a strict liability interpretation of the responsible share
standard... advances the goals of public welfare statutes and promotes increased
corporate responsibility").
84. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 86-91; PERKINS & BOYCE,
supra note 40, at 592-604.
85. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 86-91; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra
note 40, at 592-604.
The "powerlessness" defense demonstrates that the "responsible corporate
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In the environmental crimes context, this "act element" inter-
pretation has the added benefit of making statutory language
meaningful. Both the CWA and the Clean Air Act ("CAA")
include language specifically imposing criminal liability on "re-
sponsible corporate officers."86 Congress' intent in adding the
language is not perfectly clear.87 Thus, it is possible to argue
officer" doctrine does not impose liability based on corporate status alone. But
see, Truxton Hare, Comment, Reluctant Soldiers: The Criminal Liability of Cor-
porate Officers for Negligent Violations of the Clean Water Act, 138 U. PA. L.
REv. 935, 935-36 (1990) (asserting that in strict liability statutes the "responsible
corporate officer" doctrine rests liability on status alone). The "status" approach
is similar to the "duty" approach in the way that the government establishes its
prima facie case. That is, prosecution would not occur absent proof of a violation
or the defendant's status in the corporate hierarchy. However, the "status" ap-
proach precludes the officer's argument that he was incapable of carrying out his
duty to prevent the violation; the officer can argue only that the prosecution mis-
understood his place in the hierarchy. The Supreme Court has been clear that a
defense of "impossibility" is at least theoretically available. In addition, liability
based on status alone is increasingly disfavored in the criminal law (HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 78-79 (1968)) and may even
be unconstitutional. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (conviction
based on status of being a drug addict violated eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments). But see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (stating that it is constitu-
tional to convict defendant for the act of being drunk in public, even assuming
that defendant was an alcoholic).
86. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6), FWPCA § 309(c)(6) (providing that "[flor the
purpose of this subsection, the term 'person' means, in addition to the definition
obtained in [the definition section] of this title, any responsible corporate offi-
cer"), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(6), CAA § 113(c)(6) (providing the same, with un-
important differences in language). In both cases, the "subsection" at issue sets
out criminal penalties.
Congress has not added similar language to RCRA or to other environmen-
tal crime statutes. Since RCRA is similar to the CWA and the CAA in important
ways (such as the mental state provision and the definition of "person"), the lack
of special language may be an argument that the "responsible corporate officer"
doctrine does not apply to RCRA prosecutions. But cf. United States v. Mac's
Muffler Shop Inc., 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1369 (N.G. Ga. 1986) (implying,
in suit for injunction and civil penalties, that special statutory language is not
required for use of the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine as long as the stat-
ute involves protecting the public health).
87. United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991) (indicating
that the legislative history is "silent" regarding Congress's intent in adding the
term). The provision first appeared in the CWA, with no clarifying legislative
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that Congress meant only to ensure that corporate officers be
treated just like everyone else.88 However, it also is possible to
argue that the language enhances the act elements of the enforce-
ment provisions - validating that a duty exists for "responsible
corporate officers."
Assuming that the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine does
affect the act element of a crime, it is legitimate to ask whether
the doctrine can be extended beyond the type of "strict liabili-
ty"" crime represented by the FDCA ° and statutes in which it
history. When the language was added to the CAA five years later, the only com-
ment in the legislative history was: "The committee intends that criminal penal-
ties be sought against those corporate officers under whose responsibility a viola-
tion has taken place and not just those employees directly involved in the opera-
tion of the violating source." Alan Zarky, The Responsible Corporate Officer
Doctrine, 5 Toxics L. RrR. 983, 988 (1991) (quoting Report of the Committee
on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, Report. No. 95-127, 51, reprint-
ed at 6, A Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 1371,
1425).
88. Zarky, supra note 87, at 987-88. But see Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1413
(noting that identical language then found in CWA was meant to expand liability,
not restrict it); Mac's Muffler Shop Inc., 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1369 (reject-
ing the argument in a civil suit). Cf. United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d
1123, 1130 n.11 (3d Cir. 1979) (implicitly condoning use of the "responsible
corporate officer" doctrine in CWA prosecutions without mentioning statutory
language), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
89. A number of commentators predicate use of the "responsible corporate
officer" doctrine on the crime being one of strict liability. However, they do not
share a consistent definition of "strict liability." The tension is between a "norma-
tive" and a "descriptive" approach to mental state. See Mandiberg, supra note 1,
at 1167 n.10 (explaining the difference between normative and descriptive ap-
proaches).
Some commentators define "strict liability" as a lack of mens rea in the
traditional, normative sense of awareness of moral wrongdoing. E.g., John F.
Seymour, Civil and Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers Under Federal Envi-
ronmental Laws, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 337, 341 (1989); Robert I. McMurry &
Stephen D. Ramsey, Environmental Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanctions in
Enforcing Environmental Law, 19 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1133, 1153 (1986).
Others commentators define "strict liability" in a descriptive way, as a
statute that lacks a mental state term. E.g., United States v. MacDonald & Wat-
son Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 50-55 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that the "respon-
sible corporate officer" doctrine does not apply in RCRA prosecution because the
statute requires proof of "knowledge"); United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873,
894-95 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (holding the same); Barrett & Clarke, supra note 78,
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may be congressionally mandated, such as the CWA and the
CAA.9 Can the doctrine be used with RCRA, for example? The
answer is that a mechanism exists for effecting such an extension.
Rather than focus on the nature of the crime's mental state ele-
ment to justify implication of a duty, it is possible to focus on the
fact that the Act was meant to protect the public health and safe-
ty.9" The Dotterweich Court did mention, after all, both aspects
at 882-83; Richard G. Singer, The "Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine" in
Environmental Cases, 6 ToxiCs L. RPTR. (BNA) 1405 (1992); Zarky, supra note
87, at 986.
90. However, in light of the Supreme Court's current approach to interpret-
ing regulatory crime statutes, it is legitimate to ask whether the FDCA would still
be considered a crime of "strict liability." See Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 1203-
04. Even if no "awareness of non-criminal law" requirement were added, the
Court would interpret the statute as requiring awareness of the facts that made the
Act a "public welfare offense." Such awareness arguably amounts to mens rea in
the modem sense, even using a normative approach to the concept. See generally,
id. at 1211-15.
91. Some argue that the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine should not
apply at all to statutes lacking the specific language in the CAA and CWA. E.g.,
Zarky, supra note 87, at 993. Of course, such language was also absent in the
FDCA giving rise to the doctrine in the first place. In reported cases on the "re-
sponsible corporate officer" doctrine, Courts have not focused upon the lack of
statutory language. Nevertheless, RCRA lacks such language, and the two report-
ed RCRA criminal cases that directly confront use of the "responsible corporate
officer" doctrine do not allow it to be used. United States v. MacDonald & Wat-
son Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 50-55 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. White,
766 F. Supp. 873, 894-95 (E.D. Wash. 1991). Cf United States v. Mac's Muffler
Shop Inc., 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1369 (N.G. Ga. 1986) (implying, in suit for
injunction and civil penalties, that special statutory language is not required for
use of the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine as long as the statute involves
protecting the public health).
92. RCRA may not be a "public welfare offense" under the Court's current
definition that includes the criterion of uncommonness. Staples v. United States,
511 U.S. 600 (1994); see Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 1220-22 (discussing
RCRA's regulation of commonplace activities). However, there is no real doubt
that RCRA is meant to regulate public health and safety. For purposes of the
current discussion, at any rate, this Essay will tie the "responsible corporate
officer" doctrine to the latter consideration rather than to the technical inclusion
in the "public welfare offense" category.
A number of courts and commentators do conclude that the "responsible
corporate officer" doctrine can be used with a non-strict liability "public health
and safety" statute. E.g., United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 193 (6th Cir.
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of the FDCA.93 Seen this way, the proposition set down in
Dotterweich and Park is that a regulatory statute meant to protect
the public health and safety imposes a duty on responsible corpo-
rate officers to seek out and prevent violations of the statute.
Once it is established that the duty attaches to a particular defen-
dant because of his or her corporate status, voluntary omission to
perform the duty suffices for proof of the act element. The gov-
ernment still must prove the mental state element of the crime, if
any, by whatever evidence it has available.94
However, the mere existence of an extension mechanism does
not mean that the mechanism should be used. The Dotterweich
and Park courts did not articulate a jurisprudential basis for infer-
ring a duty for corporate officers, they merely hinted at one. In
fact, such a basis probably can be found in the utilitarian realm
of environmental law.95 However, can a basis be found in the
more normative, or culpability-based jurisprudence of traditional
criminal law?
In traditional criminal law, the concept of duty is another way
1992) (noting that employees are more able to ascertain relevant facts than the
general public that RCRA is designed to protect), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1033
(1993); United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1419 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine can be used with the CWA, since
the Act was meant to protect the public health); United States v. Cattle King
Packing Corp., Inc., 793 F.2d 232, 240-41 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that officer's
duty arises from nature of business, in this case meat packing), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 985 (1986). See Barrett & Clarke, supra note 78, at 882-83 (asserting that
the "goal" of the doctrine is to hold officers liable for public welfare offenses);
cf United States v. Mac's Muffler Shop, Inc., 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1369
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (suit for injunction and civil penalties under CAA).
93. See discussion supra, at note 64-70 and accompanying text.
94. Accord United States v. Cattle King Packing Co., Inc., 793 F.2d 232,
240-41 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine to
the felony provision of the Federal Meat Inspection Act so long as the govern-
ment was still required to prove intent to defraud), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985
(1986).
95. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2424 (noting the "aspirational quality" of
environmental statutes, which were intended "to force dramatic changes in exist-
ing behavior"). The rationale would be that imposition of criminal liability on
officers with "line" responsibility, assuming they had the required mental state,
would increase the deterrence function of the criminal law and thus change
behavior.
MORAL ISSUES
to reflect or assess the defendant's choice to do a moral wrong.
This connection is seen in the doctrine itself. An omission to act
is not sufficient proof of criminality unless the defendant had a
legal duty to act.96 In addition, all legal duties are based in some
way on an underlying moral duty, although the converse is not
true.97 That is, not all moral duties give rise to legal duties.
Thus, before we can assess whether duties should be imposed on
officers of corporations whose work affects the public health and
welfare, it is necessary to understand the types of moral duties
that are legal duties as well.
At this point it probably is wise to clarify that we are not deal-
ing with a duty completely imposed by statute, such as the duty
to file income tax returns or the duty to provide certain informa-
tion when involved in an automobile accident.98 The statutory
language makes these duties unambiguous. 99 The jurisprudential
basis for such clear statutory duties is of only passing interest to
the inquiry here."°
Instead, we are dealing with duties that courts, not legislatures,
have decided to import into criminal law. Violation of these du-
ties involves a failure "to intervene, when necessary, to prevent
96. See DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 86; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note
40, at 592-95 (citing 19th and early 20th century cases for the proposition that an
omission is not an "act" unless there is a duty greater than simply a moral duty).
97. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 40, at 593 n.13 (citing Coleridge, C.J. in
Regina v. Instan, 1 Q.B. 450, 453-54 (1893), for the proposition that "[i]t would
not be correct to say that every moral obligation involves a legal duty; but every
legal duty is founded on a moral obligation. A legal common law duty is nothing
else than the enforcing by law of that which is a moral obligation.").
98. Note that the environmental crimes statutes occasionally do impose
statutory duties. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b)(5), FWPCA § 31 l(b)(5) (requiring any
"person in charge" of certain facilities to report discharges of oil or hazardous
substances and imposing felony sanctions for failure to do so); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9603(a)-(b), CERCLA § 103(a)-(b) (imposing similar requirements).
99. There may of course be a constitutional problem with imposing the
duty. For example, statutory duties may raise due process "notice" problems.
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (declaring unconstitutional a city
ordinance imposing a registration duty on convicted felons).
100. Such statutory duties do, however, raise interesting jurisprudential
questions. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 422-24, 585-
86 (1978).
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the occurrence of a serious harm"'' and leads to liability for
"commission by omission."' 2 Fletcher mentions six categories
of common-law duties of this type 3 : (1) duties inferred from
the personal relationship between the defendant and a dependent
person;' '4 (2) reciprocal duties of aid inferred from "the binding
together of people to confront common risks;"'0 5 (3) duties in-
ferred from the defendant's undertaking to care for someone;
(4) duties inferred from the defendant's creation of danger;0 7
(5) duties inferred from non-criminal statutes;' and (6) duties
to control third persons." The jurisprudential basis for these
duties is of central interest to our inquiry."0
Fletcher's examination of these traditional duties (in the context
of homicide) provides insight into why they afford a basis for
criminal liability. Two dimensions of this jurisprudence are espe-
cially important. The first is the way that the concept of "duty"
functions as a method of attributing harm to a particular individu-
al."' The other dimension involves the ways in which "duty"
101. Id. at 422.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 611-22 (discussing duties in the context of homicide); see also
DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 89-91.
104. FLETCHER, supra note 100, at 611-14. The paradigmatic, but by no
means only, example here involves family relationships.
105. Id. at 614. Fletcher excepts drinking sprees from this generalization.
106. Id. at 614-17. It is normal for commentators to assert a duty based on
the existence of a contract and the breach of that contract. However, Fletcher
points out that the cases fail to support a duty based on contract alone absent
some undertaking.
107. Id. at 628-29 (pointing out difficulty in finding cases squarely support-
ing imposition of duty on defendants who were not culpable in creating the
danger itself).
108. Id. at 620-21 (giving an example of ordinance requiring property
owners to keep sidewalks clear).
109. Id. at 622 (noting, without citation, a growing body of case law).
Fletcher comments that this type of duty is better treated through principles of
accomplice liability. Id.
110. It is arguable that the responsible corporate officer's duty to seek out
and prevent regulatory violations fits directly into one of the traditional catego-
ries. However, the validity of such arguments will depend, ultimately, on the
jurisprudential fit.
111. FLETCHER, supra note 100, at 606 (asserting that the concept of duty
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analysis is different from negligence analysis.
Regarding attribution, Fletcher explains that in a sense these
duties are extensions of the traditional affirmative crimes whose
commission is at issue.'12 Before the defendant can be held lia-
ble, the harm defined by the affirmative crime must have
occurred." 3 Theories of duty explain why a particular defen-
dant, picked out from among all the people who did not act to
prevent the harm, can be held culpable for its occurrence. In
other words, Fletcher explains, the theories of duty all deal with
issues of derivative liability." 4 Such liability is imposed, in the
first place, because of the nature of the moral connection between
the harm and a particular actor's responsibility for it: "[I]n the
context of the relationship and under the particular circumstances,
the failure to avert harm is as egregious a wrong as causing the
particular harm. The impulse to recognize these duties, then, is
fundamentally an impulse toward moral consistency in the crimi-
nal law.""' 5
Thus, the choice among duties has a moral dimension. How-
ever, it is different from the moral dimension associated with
negligence analysis." 6 Fletcher points out three important dis-
tinctions. First, omissions involve a "duty to intervene and pre-
vent harm," while negligence involves a "duty of care in manag-
ing the activity.""..7 Second, omissions entail a duty owed to a
specific person or persons, while negligence addresses a duty
functions to provide "a surrogate for the causal link" between a particular actor
and the harm that occurred and "a basis for assessing culpability").
112. Id. at 422.
113. That is, a defendant will not be held liable for a breach of duty alone,
as opposed to the fate of the accident participant who fails to leave her name and
address at the scene. Id. at 423.
114. Id. at 588.
115. Id. at 611.
116. An example of negligence is an automobile driver who fails to turn on
headlights, or a railroad switch operator who fails to keep a lookout. Id. at 586.
117. Id. at 596-97 (noting "negligent failures are embedded in larger activi-
ties [such that] the negligent breach of duty converts the driving, the railroad
crossing, [and so forth] into unexpected hazards"). Fletcher notes that "[t]he
negligently managed activity creates a substantial and unjustified risk of harm. If
the harm materializes, the cause appears to be the negligent activity as a whole
rather than the isolated failure to exercise due care." Id. at 587.
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owed to the world at large." 8 A third difference is that in omis-
sions analysis the duty is owed to someone who is already in a
situation of distress, while negligence involves the duty not to
create the situation of distress." 9 Underlying all of this, perhaps,
is the notion that omissions involve "an independent human or
natural process that is the primary cause of harm," while negli-
gence involves the defendant as the primary cause of harm.'20
Fletcher's analysis suggests a way to articulate when a moral
duty becomes the type of legal duty that supports "omissions"
culpability - when, in other words, failure to act is as egregious
as affirmatively acting. An omission is criminal when danger
exists that is not created by the defendant, and the defendant, by
intervening, can prevent harm to a person or group with which he
has a pre-existing moral relationship.
Viewed in these terms, the "responsible corporate officer"
doctrine comes close to traditional omissions culpability. Consid-
er the hypothetical with which this section started. The Vice
President had allocated sufficient resources to the plant and had
instructed the Manager never to permit a discharge of the type
that occurred. However, the Manager had disobeyed. The "dan-
ger" at issue is the risk of excessive pollution of the river.'
Certainly, the Vice President did not create that danger in any
meaningful sense of the term.'22 In addition, the defendant
might have prevented the harm by being more assertive in the
management of the plant (by seeking out possible violations). The
one dimension on which "responsible corporate officer" culpabili-
ty seems to fail is the final aspect: By intervening, the officer
would not prevent harm to a particular person or group with
118. Id. at 587.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 588.
121. A NPDES permit assumes that some discharges will occur, and thus
there will be some pollution.
122. One could argue that the Vice President "created" the danger by
working for an organization that discharges waste into the river. However, the
CWA is premised on the assumption that businesses will discharge some pollut-
ants; it merely seeks to minimize the harm by regulating the nature and amount
of the discharges. Until society as a whole stops engaging in polluting activities,
the Vice President's job seems to be a valid one.
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which he has a pre-existing moral relationship. If the harm at
issue is really excessive pollution of the river,"' intervention
would prevent harm to the world at large. " If Fletcher is cor-
rect, this is an earmark of negligence, not omission culpability.
This conclusion brings us full circle, in a sense. As noted
above, courts and commentators have had trouble determining
whether to classify the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine as
a "mental state" or an "act" issue. The question of the object of
the officer's duty is, it seems, the crucial question. What is more,
the analysis reveals that our difficulty may be in attempting to
translate these traditional concerns to the regulatory context.
Sanctions on traditional crimes such as homicide and theft exist
to protect the rights of specific individuals.' Punishment for
regulatory crimes exists to protect the rights of the public at
large. In order to make the "responsible corporate officer" doc-
trine comprehensible, we may need to articulate the moral calcu-
lus that raises public rights to the same level as individual rights.
Such a task is not dissimilar from the one involved in articulating
the moral underpinnings of mens rea in the regulatory con-
text. '6
123. It is possible to argue that the officer prevents harm to his employer
and subordinates by intervening to avert an unpermitted discharge. These poten-
tial "victims" do have a pre-existing moral relationship with the officer. However,
the employer and subordinates stand in the same position as the public at large as
regards an interest in less polluted rivers. The unique harm that accrues to them
from the officer's failure to intervene is the harm involved in violating the law.
124. It is also possible to argue that the defendant has a pre-existing moral
relationship to the "group" defined by users of the river, a moral relationship
established by acceptance of the NPDES permit. Definition of the "group" may
raise issues similar to those addressed by the doctrine of standing in the civil
judicial context. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
In any case, this argument merits further exploration.
125. At least, that is how we have thought of them in the last 200 years or
so. Cf. FLETCHER, supra note 100, at 118, 232-33 (explaining that the concept of
"subjective criminality" involves seeing the purpose of, the criminal law as pro-
tecting specific legal interests and contrasting that with a pattern that focuses on
harm to the community as a whole). See also id. at 60-61 (noting that "subjec-
tive criminality" became the dominant mode of analysis in the late eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries).
126. See generally, Mandiberg, supra note 1.
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III. CONCLUSION
This Essay attempts to reveal some of the problems involved
in considering environmental crimes through the normative lens
of traditional criminal law. It is difficult to harmonize the fields
of regulatory and criminal environmental law, especially if the
endeavor is to be more than superficial. This is not to say that the
blending can not be done. It is incumbent upon those of us who
make and apply the law to articulate the modem moral precepts
that underlie our use of the criminal sanction. If we can do this
effectively, the criminal sanction will be used appropriately and
the public at large will more easily understand and accept felony
convictions and prison time for environmental crimes.
